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Scholars have argued that China’s rise poses an exceptionally high threat to East Asian neighbors and that East Asian states would increase their military effort to counter the rise. Despite such concern about China’s rise, East Asian states’ military burden has been low and decreasing since the end of the Cold War. Why is that? The purpose of this paper is to tackle the question of why China’s rise has not prompted East Asian states to increase their military burden despite its seemingly high level of threat. Rather than assuming that China’s rise has made the threat level in East Asia markedly high, I attempt to answer the question by questioning the validity of the assumption. First, I measure the threat level using existing indicators, including relative economic and military power balance, various kinds of rivalries, and economic incentives for territorial expansion. Then, I compare the seven regions, including East Asia, the Middle East, Europe, and Latin America, over these indicators from 1970 to 2019. Contrary to the common assumption, I find that none of these indicators show that the threat level in East Asia is increasing or is distinctly higher than in other regions. The result indicates that the military burden in East Asia has been low and not increasing because of, not despite, the threat level East Asian states face.