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Authoritarian states often engage in massive media campaigns in international conflicts to keep domestic public opinion in line with the states’ preferred foreign policy. Media campaigns are government-orchestrated, concerted efforts to attract public attention towards, and shape citizens’ views of, a foreign policy dispute by the use of mass media. Despite their similarities in terms of the dramatic increase in the volume of media coverage and the adoption of negative rhetoric to various degrees due to the contentious nature of the disputes, these media campaigns serve opposing political purposes: one is to mobilize, and the other is to pacify. This research outlines the distinctions between these campaign types and tests them through computer-assisted text analysis of eleven media campaigns China has launched in territorial disputes with its neighbors since the founding of the People’s Republic. The striking features of these campaign types are reflected in the valence, narratives, and emotions of the media coverage. For example, mobilization campaigns use more negative words and pacification campaigns use more positive words; reference to the opponent country or people is more negative in mobilization campaigns and more positive in pacification campaigns; each campaign type is distinguished by frequent words and topics; mobilization campaigns also evoke more negative, stronger emotions, such as hatred or anger, and pacification campaigns more positive and less intense negative emotions, such as sadness or fear. The ability to distinguish between media campaigns could serve to effectively detect and decipher state intentions based on publicly available data. Given the usual elusiveness of authoritarian state behaviors and the general proclivity of states to misrepresent their intentions in foreign policy crises, this research could be of tremendous value to foreign policymakers who wish to better understand an opponent state’s foreign policy objectives from evidence, as opposed to instinct or conjecture.