Economic Interdependence and Security Cooperation with a Third-Party Great Power

• In Event: Poster Session: International Security 2

Abstract

How does economic interdependence between a country and a great power influence its security relationship with a third-party great power? This question is relevant as the world is returning to an era when geopolitics, especially great power competition, has become salient to economic cooperation. This paper uses the Indo-Pacific region as a case study and examines how regional countries' economic interdependence with China influences their security cooperation with the United States. The theoretical expectation is that economic interdependence with a great power puts a weaker state in a vulnerable position. As a result, it turns to another great power, seeking more security cooperation to hedge the (potential) coercion from the first great power. Empirically, the finding is that the more trade dependence with China, the higher probability that a country conducts military exercises with the United States. This finding shows the sophisticated effect that economic interdependence can have, especially when operating within a great power competition environment.

Author

• Qiang Wu, Texas A&M University