External Support to Rebels and the Monitoring of Insurgent-Civilian Interactions

• In Event: Poster Session: International Security 2

Abstract

How do foreign sponsors manage rebel violence in civil wars? This article builds theory on how, why, and when external states monitor the interactions with civilians of the insurgents they support. As actors who are sensitive, to various degrees, to costs at domestic and international levels, states can undertake various measures to limit the risks of being publicly associated with atrocities-committing rebel groups abroad. I argue that the degree to which a sponsor supervises insurgents depends on a combination of his perception of the likelihood of its support becoming public and its perception of the costs it will face if its support for violent rebels becomes public. These factors determine whether the sponsor considers the monitoring costs worthwhile. I assess the theory’s robustness via a study of the United States’ (US) monitoring of the People’s Protection Units (YPG) and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) between 2014 and 2020. Through a review of written sources and interviews with researchers, former US officials, YPG/SDF militants, and Syrian journalists, I show that the nature of US support and the potential costs associated led the US to monitor the YPG/SDF proactively in Northeast Syria. Additional evidence from the US support for the Free Syrian Army (FSA) corroborates the theory.

Author

• Arthur Stein, Université de Montréal