More Votes, More Seats? The Green Party’s Electoral System Reforms in Germany

• In Event: Electoral Laws and the (In)equality of Democratic Representation

Abstract

Recent electoral system reforms increase voters’ influence on which candidates win seats. Why are parties willing to give away the degree to which they control nominations? This article investigates the 2011 electoral system reforms in Bremen and Hamburg. Contrary to the prevailing view that politicians implement candidate-centered reforms in response to public opinion, I find evidence that the Green Party pursued reform to maximize its vote and seat share. However, estimates of a synthetic difference-in-differences design suggest that the Greens have performed worse than they would have under the status quo. Although voters with warm feelings for the Green Party are slightly more likely to turn out, the reforms heavily suppress electoral participation. The article is the first to point to parties’ seat-maximizing incentives in pursuing candidate-centered electoral system reforms. It also weighs in on voting behavior under candidate-centered systems and the causal relationship between electoral system complexity and turnout.

Author

• Victor Ellenbroek, European University Institute