Playing with Design: How Informal Intergovernmental Organizations Change

• In Event: Poster Session: Aid and International Organizations in IPE & Contemporary Issues in Political Science Education
  In Poster Session: Poster Session: Aid and International Organizations in IPE

Abstract

Explanations for International Organizations’ (IOs) longevity and vitality have often focused on high levels of institutionalization and the presence of empowered bodies of international bureaucrats. However, there are important IOs such as the G-Groups (G7, G20) which have proven remarkably durable despite operating under softer law and lacking well- developed bureaucratic bodies. What explains the vitality and longevity of informal IOs? This article presents a theoretical framework for how strategic changes to levels of institutionalization over time within informal IOs can explain trends in their vitality. I argue that powerful members prefer low levels of institutionalization across the IO's design to exercise control. However, as IOs age, there may be times when the initial design has to be compromised to secure vitality or survival. I introduce two conditions under which the members of an IO may decide to increase the institutionalization of some organizational dimensions: due to an unforeseen demand for technical expertise, and following institutional learning. Support for this argument is provided through the case of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Drawing on institutional documents and elite interviews, I demonstrate that the FATF has increased the institutionalization of its more technical dimensions (e.g., its monitoring and mandate), while keeping others with higher distributional costs closer to its informal initial design (e.g., its membership). In this way, the FATF has secured its existence and become a key player in the global governance of money laundering and terrorism financing.

Author

• Isabel Rodriguez-Toribio, Concordia University