Why Discussion Rules Matter for Representation: Experimental Evidence from India

• In Event: Gender, Politics, & Institutional Features in the U.S. & Comparative Contexts

Abstract

Research on representative democracy often assumes that elected officials from disadvantaged and dominant groups are equally influential once in office. Drawing on an original survey in 600 Indian village councils, we 1) leverage both reputational measures and behavioral observations to show that this assumption does not hold, and 2) Implement an intervention to alleviate the gender gap in influence detected in 1. In the first part of the paper, we rely on an array of objective and subjective indicators to show that female village council presidents (sarpanches) elected through gender quotas do not equally affect decision-making in village councils after their election. This suggests that reforms aiming to increase the representation of members of disadvantaged groups (e.g. quotas) may not alone suffice to enable individuals from traditionally excluded groups to affect policy. Taking stock of this, the second part of the paper investigates whether changes in formal rules of discussion, in a standardized version of local village council meetings, can increase the influence that female officials have in a collective decision-making process.

Authors

• Rachel E. Brule, Boston University

• Simon Chauchard, University Carlos 3 of Madrid

• Alyssa Heinze, University of California, Berkeley