The Effects of Malapportionment on the Representation of District Interests

• In Event: Disproportionality, Inequality, and the Structure of Electoral Systems

Abstract

A normatively appealing characteristic of most representative democracies is that their electoral rules are designed to assure that each group of voters receives representation roughly proportionate to their number. Scholars have devoted a great deal of attention to malapportionment precisely because it is a violation of this principle. However, discerning the effects of malapportionment can be challenging because the intentional overrepresentation (underrepresentation) of some districts is almost always associated with characteristics of the districts that can confound the effects of the number of MPs they select. I take advantage of the design of elections to the Italian Senate between 1994 and 2001 and a comprehensive database of actions by individual MPs to disentangle the real benefits of being relatively overrepresented. Using a regression discontinuity design based on close elections, I first show that the electoral system of the Italian Senate caused malapportionment, by allowing otherwise similar districts to elect either one or two senators. I then find that districts that barely elect two representatives are more frequently the target of a wide range of legislative and non-legislative activities than districts electing one representative. The results of this study demonstrate the political consequences of uneven representation and contribute to the debate about the design of electoral institutions.

Author

• Massimo Troncone, ETH Zurich