Conflict Tactics in Degraded Environments

• In Event: Political Economy of War: Theories and Implications

Abstract

I develop a dynamic model of tactical decision making in civil conflict that explores when and why combatants choose to target natural and produced capital under control of their opponents, versus perpetrating violence against non-combatants. A government and an insurgent group can direct force against two types of targets--citizens that may support their opponent and the resources that enable each side to fight. The choice of tactics by each party affects citizens' decision of which side to support, which may lead to moderation or escalation of the use of destructive war-fighting tactics. I show that, in a static baseline model, violence against citizens and destruction of capital are often substitute tactics, and the government and insurgent group adopt opposite strategies, resource constrained insurgents choosing violence against citizens and the government choosing high levels of capital destruction. I then introduce uncertainty for all players about the quality of resources in the future, arising from natural or man-made factors like climate change. If an area beset by insurgency is likely to become degraded in the future, this may lead the government to increase violence against civilians. When expected returns from controlling territory and population in the future decrease, maintaining popular support becomes less essential for the government, and it may adopt more extreme violence to defeat an insurgency today.

Author

• Jessica Sun, Emory University