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Governments that violate international law frequently craft public narratives designed to reduce backlash and minimize demand for punishment. Under what conditions do these strategies avoid the reputational consequences of non-compliance? This paper examines political competition over the interpretation of international law violations. Drawing on image repair theory, we theorize that two primary factors affect an audience's interpretation of transgressions: the level of certainty about the allegation and the degree to which the behavior contravenes an established norm. When non-compliance occurs, intergovernmental contestation over facts and norms affects foreign audiences' preferences for the severity and speed of punitive action. We provide evidence of reputation management in action through analyses of twitter data related to several key international crises. We then test our theory in a survey experiment examining US citizens' willingness to punish foreign governments for violations of trade and humanitarian law. The results suggest that governments can successfully reduce reputation costs arising from violations, but
strategies differ in their ability to reduce certainty and outrage. Our findings provide insight into how contestation may affect international law over the long term. While disinformation might induce uncertainty, our research suggests it also increases moral outrage, which may lead to more consequential punishments and reinforcement of regimes.