Post-office Careers of Authoritarian Elites: Evidence from Russia’s Governors

• In Event: Political Succession and Elite Survival in Authoritarian Regimes

Abstract

What happens once authoritarian political elites leave office, and are there alternative career paths available to former officeholders under authoritarianism? Studies have found that authoritarian elites are rewarded or sanctioned primarily based on their political loyalty and/or performance in office, among other things. Most competence-loyalty accounts have treated elite continuous survival in office as evidence of political rewards bestowed by an autocrat. However, elites can also be rewarded through promotions to different, more desirable posts, they can move horizontally to similar positions; they can also leave politics altogether but still be rewarded via important state company appointments, among other. That is, understanding career options and goals of authoritarian elites is important for a better grasp of elite management in autocracies.

Furthermore, having outside career options may influence how, and whether, authoritarian elites perform in office in service of an autocrat. It is often assumed that in contrast to former democratic politicians who turn to private sector employment through the so-called “revolving door”, or pursue other careers, nondemocratic politicians have no such option and they either have to stay in politics, or retire fully. This also happens because democratic politicians postpone wealth acquisition until after office, while their nondemocratic peers presumably seek wealth in office through rent-seeking. This characterisation, while not inaccurate in general, is however too simplistic as private sector opportunities are often available to former authoritarian elites; such elites are also heterogenous with respect to their market ability or political connections. In turn, if shirking from public interest and agency loss is a serious problem in the context of "revolving door" in democracies, authoritarian elites who foresee future career opportunities may equally experience agency loss, albeit from the point of view of the autocrat.

In this paper we extend the career concerns and revolving door literature to a new empirical domain of authoritarian politics. We propose a theory of the post-office careers under authoritarianism in an environment with a political sector and a private sector. Then, drawing from a novel data set that documents the career trajectories of all serving and former Russian regional governors from 2004-2020 after leaving their regional offices, we explain how their performance in office, personal background, and outside economic opportunities influence what ex-governors can do, and why. We also discuss how the federal center can restrict shirking and agency loss by limiting outside career opportunities, and through reshuffles. This paper contributes to two important literatures, first on career concerns and revolving door, and second, to an increasingly prominent literature on the competence-loyalty trade-off in dictatorships.

Author

• Nikita Khokhlov, Dublin City University