Democracy, Autocracy, and the Design of International Organizations

• In Event: Regime Type and International Cooperation

Abstract

This paper revisits the relationship between regime type and international cooperation with a particular focus on the design of international organizations (IOs). How and why does the regime composition of IO memberships shape the institutional design of these organizations? The paper explores this question by examining three key dimensions of institutional design: delegation of authority to supranational IO bodies, pooling of authority through majority voting in intergovernmental IO bodies, and conferral of access to transnational actors such as civil society and business. Starting from the assumption that regime type and institutional design are linked in more complex ways than conventionally acknowledged, the paper develops a novel theoretical argument about this relationship and the factors that moderate it. Specifically, it unpacks regime type to theorize how varieties of democracy/autocracy in the membership of IOs may have different effects on the institutional design of these organizations. The empirical analysis is based on a unique combination of data covering the institutional design of 40 IOs from 1950 to 2019, thus allowing for a more comprehensive evaluation of this relationship than any previous study. The results show how the regime composition of IOs shapes the design of these organizations in heterogeneous but predictable ways. The findings of the paper have implications for ongoing debates on effects of autocratization and institutional design in international cooperation.

Authors

• Jonas Tallberg, Stockholm University

• Carl Vikberg, Stockholm University