Creada la Ley, Creada la Trampa: Quotas, Party Strategy, and the Gender Gap

• In Event: Gender and Candidate Selection

Abstract

Changes in the gender composition of legislatures have been achieved thanks to gender quotas, changes in the electorate, and diversification of the candidate pool. Despite advances, gender gaps in descriptive representation still prevail. Research has highlighted various mechanisms that influence higher (and lower) levels of female representation. Among others, the literature has shown the effect of party strategy, party organization, and electoral rules. In this paper, we focus on the interaction between party strategy and the incentives created by electoral rules. Using an original dataset of legislative candidates in Ecuador between 2002 and 2021, we show that an unintended consequence of gender quotas is parties gaming the system: they comply with the rules while maintaining old, gendered practices. Furthermore, parties strategically allocate low- and high-status candidates on the ballot and across electoral districts. We find that high-status women are being rewarded at a lower rate than male candidates with a similar status. We also show that low-status women are being sacrificed at a higher rate than low-status men. More generally, our findings suggest that while changing electoral rules can reduce gaps in descriptive representation, parties find a way around them.

Authors

• Diana Davila Gordillo, Leiden University

• Selina Hofstetter, Tecnológico de Monterrey

• Sebastian Vallejo Vera, Western University