Priors Are Priority: The Role of Scientific Evidence in Information-Processing

• In Event: Poster Session: STEP 2 & New Perspectives within Political Psychology
  In Poster Session: Poster Session: STEP 2

Abstract

Crucial to the current context of mis-information and dis-information is the role scientific evidence as a cue or a warranty seal that information is credible or valid. However, we know very little about how scientific information is processed by public opinion and whether it may act as a credibility cue. From a normative point of view, it would be reassuring to find that individuals, whether public opinion or political elites, are more responsive and attentive to evidence-based information, but to date existing literature shows mixed evidence of whether this is the case. Most importantly we also lack knowledge of under which conditions scientific evidence is more prone to be picked up or ignored. A large part of the research focuses on scientific evidence on policy problems -e.g., climate change, poverty, redistribution, etc- but little work examines the role of scientific information in shaping debates around policy proposals and solutions, and whether it is successful in attracting more attention and shaping support across the public. Hence this paper explores the question of to what extent does scientific information shape attention and support for policy proposals? When policy proposals are related to the field of welfare, or social and civil rights, the literature depicts two very different set of predictions. Political economy literature portrays individuals as rational calculators, having very clear-cut ideas about what benefits them. In this context, they should pay attention to scientific information, but only adapt their preferences if it is in line with their material self-interest. On the other hand, motivated reasoning scholarship in the field of political psychology, rather presents public opinion as being emotionally driven, striving to confirm beliefs. This latter rationale means that individuals should largely ignore scientific information, and process it in a biased manner: only when it confirms pre-existing beliefs. I reconcile these two strands of work by proposing that while individuals seek out to confirm their beliefs most of the time, they may sometimes face larger incentives to update these and reach accurate conclusions, in line with the political economy logic. Such incentives are likely to be present if individuals are directly affected by an issue and/or care strongly about it. I employ comparative experimental data to test this argument. More particularly, I design a vignette experiment on the topic of welfare reform and cash transfers, specifically on the debate on introducing a universal basic income (UBI) or conditional cash transfers, and which is best for the future of employment, which is currently threatened by technological development and innovation. The vignette experiment manipulates the presence/absence of scientific cues and the effect on of a UBI on employment prospects. Findings show that scientific information does not increase attention or shape to policy proposals, and neither does belief-congruent information. Rather, prior beliefs per se, have a direct impact on attention and support. This is the case even when individuals face significant incentives to update their beliefs, in order to translate their interests to relevant policy preferences. The findings presented in this paper have far reaching implications to the study of information-processing.

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