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Welfare state reform is very difficult because social polies are multidimensional and so is distributive conflict. Remarkably, most empirical studies on policy preferences for welfare state programs treat policy preferences as unidimensional. Such approaches are unable to provide insight into the multi-dimensional trade-offs which are involved in welfare state reform. In this paper, we present a novel choice experiment. In a survey, representative of the Dutch population, respondents were asked to make choices between policy packages consisting of a number of institutional dimensions of social welfare, such as benefit levels, obligations regarding activation, benefit sanctions, earnings disregards, and the costs for the taxpayers. We find that respondents are in favor of policy packages with generous benefits and earnings disregards in combination with more activating dimensions such as work incentives and job search monitoring. Furthermore, the results show that respondents’ preferences for the design of welfare are driven mainly by self-interest, preference for equality, and trust in government, but not by risk aversion. Our experimental approach provides insight into the multidimensional preferences of policy constituencies and the distributive politics which are related to welfare state reform.