When Do Trade Shocks Contribute to Anti-democratic Attitudes?

• In Event: Perspectives on American Political Economy

Abstract

When does dis-satisfaction with valence outcomes threaten public support for democracy? Building on recent papers by Autor et al (2020) and Ballard Rosa et al (2021, 2022) I explore the effect of Chinese trade competition on democratic attitudes. I suggest simple innovations in how this type of work assesses the potential anti-democratic effects of trade competition. Using a novel, geo-coded, nationally representative survey I examine support for an index of specific tools of democratic backsliding like electoral manipulation – a complement to prior approaches which have often focused on psychological measures of authoritarianism. I then explore how repeated exposure to trade shocks across presidencies of different parties affects citizen attitudes. I have two principal findings. First, I find that the existing China shock measure does not predict support for specific anti-democratic behavior, in contrast to strong findings of psychological effects. Second, I find interesting treatment effect heterogeneity. Among commuter zones in the 50% most hard hit by the China shock during the later parts of George W. Bush’s presidency, the trade shock during Obama’s first term is predictive of anti-democratic attitudes. I argue this is explained by a simple logic reflective of populist political rhetoric. Economic hardship under consecutive administrations across party lines exhausts citizen satisfaction with the political establishment and may motivate a turn to extremism and anti-democracy.

Author

• Daniel Markovits, Columbia University