Judicial Resilience: How Judges Manage Pressures in China's Anti-crime Campaigns

• In Event: Comparative Courts & Legal Systems Mini-Conference: Democracy and the Courts

Abstract

Drawing on data analysis of 137,282 adjudication documents with 253,152 defendants, this article studies judicial decision-making during anti-crime campaigns in China. The authors find an emerging pattern of judicial resilience during the “Sweep Away Black and Eradicating Evil Force” campaign initiated by the Chinese Communist Party, which illustrates judicial accommodation of mounting political pressures and the efforts of judges to maintain a balance between law and politics in criminal adjudication. Instead of either challenging or submitting directly to the campaign policies, judges constantly adjust their judicial behaviors within the legal framework, by refraining from imposing excessively severe penalties during the routine campaign period, temporarily increasing the severity of penalties when there is direct central supervision, and restraining the use of discretionary probation. The findings expand the understanding of judicial decision-making under political pressure in authoritarian regimes.

Author

• Yu Zeng, Shanghai Jiao Tong University