The Influence of Security Alliance Membership on Domestic War Powers Legislation

• In Event: Domestic Politics and War

Abstract

Research on legislative war powers has significantly expanded since the end of the Cold War, but the relationship between these domestic laws and international organizations remains under-explored. Security alliances that expect new members to commit to both collective defence and fully democratic institutions face a balancing act when it comes to domestic war powers legislation. This paper introduces a typology of security alliances based on membership conditions to identify where this challenge is most likely to be seen. It then looks to NATO and its post-Cold War expansion to understand the circumstances in which states are more likely to weaken legislative oversight to meet expectations of operational flexibility. Several factors previously associated with variation in war powers across democratic states are considered, with higher absolute military spending in particular shown to correlate with a weakening of legislative war powers, suggesting pressure for change is exerted on members the organization deems most operationally relevant. Future lines of inquiry are suggested, including the influence of domestic politics and EU membership aspirations on NATO conditionality and changes in war powers. As NATO-like replication remains on the table in Asia, this research identifies important tensions between collective defence and democratic oversight.

Author

• Samuel Morgan, University of California, Irvine