Principal-agent Dynamics and Public Diplomacy Messaging

• In Event: Public Diplomacy and Bureaucracy

Abstract

Communication is central to U.S. public diplomacy, and much research has focused on the type and content of messages that are most effective in changing foreign public opinion. However, diplomatic communication officers often receive inconsistent messaging recommendations from different offices in the State Department. How does this process contribute to a diplomat’s public messaging decisions? Using a principal-agent framework, we theorize that communication officers will be more likely to implement their preferred message when various principals within the government offer conflict instructions. In collaboration with the State Department, we propose a research design to test this with a survey experiment on a wide set of diplomatic officers stationed around the globe. This study will allow for a greater understanding of how bureaucratic politics affect a state’s ability to engage in coherent public diplomacy.

Authors

• Kelly Matush, Florida State University

• Christina J. Schneider, University of California, San Diego

• Jennifer L Tobin, Georgetown University