How Local Capacity Shapes Urban Distributive Politics

• In Event: Distributive Politics, Inequality, and Representation in Urban Politics

Abstract

Theories of distributive politics often focus on electoral targeting. The dynamics of distribution may operate differently in cities that skew heavily towards one party and where local races are largely non-competitive. I argue that simple eligibility criteria and path dependence may play an important and largely understudied role in shaping the distribution of urban funding. I study the case of New York City discretionary expenditures by council members. After geocoding the addresses of over 70,000 grant recipient organizations between 2014 and 2022, I use voter file data and precinct-level election returns to construct granular demographic and political profiles of over 4,000 neighborhoods across each city council district. I find no evidence that voter turnout or incumbent voteshare shape the distribution of funds, but I do find that discretionary grants accrue disproportionately to wealthier and whiter neighborhoods. However, this pattern can largely be explained by the fact that the non-profits eligible to receive the discretionary funding tend to be located in these neighborhoods. These findings illustrate the difficulty in designing equitable transfer systems even when electoral considerations are not paramount. Instead, the combination of existing spatial inequality and path dependence can constrain the ability of elected officials to target needy areas.

Author

• Julia Payson, UCLA