Voting and Proactive Social Norm Compliance

• In Event: Electoral and Voter Behavior

Abstract

A large literature focuses on the extrinsic rewards associated with voting, which are a function of the likelihood that that action is observed. This means that citizens should be more likely to vote when the perceived probability that their (non-)participation will become known increases. Prior work investigates the existence and development of social norms that provide for those rewards, as well as how the application of social pressure to comply with voting norms affects the decision to participate. That latter response is generally interpreted as a reactive effort to avoid the prospect of feeling shame or embarrassment should others find out they did not vote. Less examined, however, is whether people might be proactive and instead take active steps to increase the probability of their norm compliance being observed. We test this possibility with a series of survey experiments. First, we show that providing information that a person was seen voting (compared to having claimed to have voted) increases how favorably they are viewed. We then assess whether people report a willingness to incur additional voting costs if doing so enhances the chances of being seen while turning out. Our results have important implications for understanding the factors that shape the extrinsic rewards people receive from voting and the creation of mobilization strategies that are less likely to incur the backlash associated with social pressure messages.

Authors

• Daniel R. Biggers, University of California, Riverside

• Alex Ross, Université Laval