Democracy Deceives Itself: The 2016 Election and the Logic of Influence

• In Event: Misinformation, Disinformation, and Social Media Platforms

Abstract

We do not lack for information about the Russian campaign to influence the 2016 election, but we are still struggling to interpret it. Social scientists will continue to debate the impact of the Russian disinformation campaign for years to come. Its marginal effects are extremely difficult to measure in the face of so many confounding factors. At best, Russia found a perfect patch of soil for its ‘active measures’ to flourish. At worst, Russian disinformation was just a symptom of more serious underlying conditions within American society. The irony here is that more conducive conditions for foreign disinformation may render the foreign campaign irrelevant. But this raises a more general question about political disinformation: is it even a form of deception at all? A conventional assumption is that disinformation works by disguising the truth. The disinformation artist plants fake news, forged documents, and malicious rumors, disguising their true source to frustrate attribution and maintain plausible deniability. As gullible people consume fraudulent content and pass it on to their gullible friends, public opinion shifts in the desired direction. This is the logic of deception, the exploitation of collective trust for competitive gain. If disinformation is indeed deception, furthermore, then it should depend on four conditions that should be familiar by now—access, organization, cooperation, and security. The failure of any of these necessary conditions should lead to the failure of deception. As security is compromised, deception is defeated. Once the lie is unmasked, and the deceiver attributed, disinformation should lose its power. We know all too well, however, that this is usually not what happens. The attribution of Russian involvement in the months prior to the November 2016 election did not end Russian influence in American politics. Instead, Russia became yet another lightning rod for polarized rhetoric. The effects persisted not only during the campaign but long after through a series of controversial investigations and impeachment hearings. The public unmasking of disinformation does not necessarily stop its spread. On the contrary, publicity can amplify its effects. As one side accuses the other of being duped by foreign trolls, the other side reacts with indignation and complains of political bias. As truth becomes politicized, lies are deliberately amplified. The willingness to repeat a questionable rumor, or to debunk it, then becomes a mark of political membership. Thus, for example, “stop the steal” became a rallying cry for the American right after the 2020 election. As more evidence accumulated that nothing was stolen at all, the “big lie” became an even better litmus test for political loyalty in the ensuing years. Sometimes disinformation is not deception at all. This paper provides a fresh interpretation of disinformation in the 2016 election as a political signaling process driven by the witting participation of a political community.

Author

• Jon R. Lindsay, Georgia Tech