From Battlefield to Power Sharing: How Regime Type Influences Post-conflict Agreements

• In Event: Building and Breaking Peace

Abstract

How do domestic institutions affect autocratic leaders’ decisions to share power with rebel groups to cease civil conflicts? This study explores the impact of regime type on the likelihood of signing power-sharing agreements following civil conflicts and their implications for post-conflict peace and stability. Drawing on global civil war data, the study theorizes the behavior of personalist, military, and party regimes, arguing that the nature of these political systems significantly influences their propensities towards power-sharing agreements. The analysis highlights personalist regimes as more inclined to sign power-sharing agreements, owing to the concentration of power. However, it also posits potential pitfalls in the lasting peace these agreements can yield due to the limited inclusivity in the decision-making process. Contrastingly, non-personalist regimes, specifically military and party regimes, are hypothesized to be more resistant to power-sharing, especially when it pertains to military power-sharing, owing to issues of national security and preservation of the existing power hierarchy. Yet, when these regimes do engage in power-sharing, the agreements are argued to be more robust and enduring due to their more inclusive negotiation process. The empirical strategy employs time-series cross-sectional data, taking into account a range of confounding variables, with findings in line with the proposed hypotheses. Ultimately, this research underscores the need for a nuanced understanding of political regimes in shaping post-conflict resolutions and long-term peacebuilding.

Authors

• A. Yasir Atalan, American University

• Zeynep Koseoglu Onat, University of California Davis

• Feyza Koseoglu Darilmaz, George Mason University