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Analysts of contemporary life describe our era as not just post-truth, but also post-trust, characterized by phenomena such as climate change and Covid-19 denial, all eroding trust in science and politics. Solutions to such problems are usually sought in attempts “to boost trust in expertise, improve communication on scientific developments, and strengthen evidence-informed policy-making” (Naja, 2018). Implicit in such attempts is the assumption that without trust “societies really could not exist” (Sasaki, 2019: 1), that trust (in people, social institutions such as government, etc.) is good and mistrust is bad (see e.g. Hosking, 2019).
My presentation problematises this assumption. The core of this presentation is dedicated to the ways in which individuals are made trusting subjects, or rather how trust makes subjects. To this end, I will show how trust involves a double process of subjectification, the recognition of (another) person, and self-subjectification through the act of trusting someone: I trust you, therefore I am!
In the first part I will analyse how social theories conceptualise trust, e.g. the basis and prerequisites of social life; as a rational solution to an informational problem and as affective attachment. In the second part, I lay out a concept of subjectification that draws on theories of subjectification and individuation. Here I also develop the concept of subjectification through trust, consequently differentiating three ideal types of subjectification and their relation to trust (and mistrust). I will conclude this presentation by showing why efforts to increase trust or mistrust are not sufficient to solve the problems of our time. For example, solutions to the current climate crisis cannot be found simply by increasing trust in the research of climate scientists. It requires a new relationship with nature and, consequently, an overcoming of a form of subjectivity that consists of or depends on trust.