(iPoster) Populist Parties in Power and Attacks on the Judiciary in Latin America

• In Event: Poster Sessions: Law and Courts & Elections and Voter Behavior
  In Poster Session: Poster Session: Law and Courts

Abstract

How and under which conditions do populist governments attack judicial independence? Existing accounts of democratic backsliding in Latin America emphasize strong leaders and crises but pay less attention to the governing coalitions and institutional environments that enable pressure on courts. This article develops a coalition-centered theory of populist judicial attacks, conceptualizing populism not merely as a trait of individual presidents, but as an ideological property of governing coalitions. I argue that when these coalitions claim exclusive representation of "the people" against a corrupt "elite," judicial autonomy becomes a structural obstacle. Attacks on courts thus emerge as a strategic tool to neutralize rival veto players. However, this threat is conditional: party-system polarization lowers the reputational costs of undermining courts by framing them as partisan enemies, while strong legislative constraints raise the institutional costs of executive overreach.
Empirically, I assemble a country-year dataset for 19 Latin American countries from 1980 to 2019. The analysis combines V-Dem indicators of attacks on the judiciary, institutional constraints, polarization, and democratic quality with V-Party measures of populism and World Bank economic data. Using dynamic fixed-effects models with a lagged dependent variable, I estimate how changes in the populist composition of governing coalitions affect subsequent attacks on courts.
The results show that higher levels of populism in the governing coalition are associated with frequent and intense attacks on the judiciary, net of past attacks, regime quality, and economic conditions. Essentially, this effect is amplified in polarized party systems and sharply weakened where legislative constraints are strong. Alternative measures of judicial strength alone do not exhibit a comparable moderating role. The findings portray judicial erosion as a coalition strategy conditioned by polarization and institutional design, highlighting the centrality of legislative oversight for defending courts in an era of democratic backsliding.

Author

• Gabriellen da Silva Xavier do Carmo, University of Missouri-Columbia