Hurting Diversity: Diversification of Militant Tactics and Civil Conflict Negotiations

• In Event: Shaping Conflict Narratives: Global Perspectives

Abstract

Why do some rebel groups enter negotiations with governments, but others do not? There has been a great deal of research on the role of battlefield dynamics in negotiations with rebels. Previous studies converge on the idea that as the parties to the conflict incur greater conflict-induced costs, they will get closer to a ripe moment where they will consider stopping the conflict and negotiating peace. But ripeness is "perceptual by nature" as Zartman (2000) suggests, which makes it difficult to precisely test this argument in relation to how it affects negotiation dynamics. We focus on a more observable component of ripeness and argue that greater diversification of militant attacks has a cost-increasing impact on both the rebels and the government by increasing unpredictability in the conflict environment and decreasing the resources available to the rebels to sustain the conflict. Such an impact would encourage both sides to prefer negotiation over continuing the conflict. We also argue that diversifying their tactical portfolio by including a particular set of tactics, namely, suicide bombing, coordinated attacks, and facility/infrastructure attacks especially enhances rebels' chances of getting the government to the negotiating table. Empirical tests support our propositions. Our findings are robust to a multitude of different model specifications.

Author

• Mustafa Kirisci, Moravian University