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About Annual Meeting
Traditionally, professions have largely regulated themselves, but in recent years many countries have seen a gradual shift away from this model toward an increasing regulatory role for states. Yet relatively little research attention has been directed toward understanding the causes of this trend toward greater state involvement. As a step in this direction, we examine the creation in the United States of the Public Companies Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Our analysis views professions as institutional fields and draws on the broader sociological research on state regulation of industries and markets. Consistent with institutional theory, we find that a legitimacy crisis recognized by almost all parties opened the door to regulatory change. However, the form of the new regulatory arrangements resulted from political contention among the accounting profession, the state, and outsider groups, including corporate clients, investors, and the legal profession. Our findings document the applicability of regulatory theories to the professional context, but also show ways in which that context calls for modifications.