The Structure of the Anti-corruption Field

• In Event: The Sociology of Corruption.

Abstract

In this chapter I argue that the contemporary anti-corruption agenda is not just a toolbox of technical “best practices,” but a transnational field of expertise that helps define what counts as corruption, how it should be measured, and which interventions become politically and institutionally legitimate. I claim that, although scholars have studied corruption’s causes and institutional designs, we still pay too little attention to how anti-corruption expertise is built, stabilized, and circulated across borders—and how that process reshapes politics through concepts, indicators, and policy formulas.

Using evidence from a broader mixed-methods project based on three years of fieldwork in four countries, I map the power structure of the anti-corruption expert world. I find that influence concentrates around three dominant poles: a geographical pole anchored in U.S. academia (especially tenured professors), a methodological pole that elevates quantitative economists and the authority of numbers, and a mediatic pole that rewards practitioners with high levels of public exposure. These poles affect who gains recognition from key institutions (universities, multilateral organizations, INGOs, and media), and they shape the conditions under which anti-corruption knowledge is produced.

I also highlight differences in autonomy inside the field: the most autonomous actors tend to be tenured U.S.-based academics; quantitative experts often sit closer to international financial institutions and experience lower autonomy; and bureaucratic insiders can have relative autonomy but remain distant from the main centers of power. I conclude that quantitative approaches are not inherently more neutral—just more institutionally valued—and that a reflexive, sociological lens is essential to avoid adopting prepackaged categories that can lead us to “fight the wrong battle.”

Author

• Byron Villacis, University of Oregon