Labor Matters: Why Chinese Food-delivery Platforms Can Exercise Stronger Control Over Workers Than the US

• In Event: Comparative-Historical Sociology Section Roundtables
  In Refereed Roundtable (60 minute): Comparative-Historical Roundtable 4

Abstract

This article addresses the question of why Chinese food-delivery platforms can exercise stronger control over workers than the US, drawing on the concept of platform architecture and field theory. Through a comparative study of three types of food-delivery platforms in China and US, the article demonstrates the scale of proletarianized population, the labor law legislation and enforcement, the company business strategy and market competition, and state-company interactions drive platform companies to implement particular kinds of platform architecture. It argues China’s larger scale of proletarianized population, stronger labor laws but weaker enforcement, more intense market competition, and the state’s expectations of platform companies enable Chinese food-delivery platforms to exercise stronger control over workers in comparison to their US counterparts. This article reveals and explains the variations of platform architecture in different contexts, contributing to scholarship on platform economy and sociology of markets.

Author

• Jingting Liang, Johns Hopkins University