Considering the Role of Legal and Illegal Incentives in the Desistance Process

• In Event: Examining the Relationship Between Employment and Criminal Offending: Four Approaches

Abstract

Rational choice perspectives argue that offenders remain involved in crime as long as they perceive it will net more benefits than costs. A related concept understudied in criminology is the standard labor economic concept of one’s reservation wage, which is the lowest wage rate at which a worker would be willing to accept a particular type of job. This paper puts forth two related ideas: a) desistance from crime can be explained by an individual’s illegal reservation wage increasing over time, and b) changes in one’s reservation wage is closely tied to criminological theories of identity change and cognitive shifts. Using a sample of serious adolescent offenders for whom we have detailed information about illegal wages, and criminal activity over seven years, we observe that offenders who engage in illegal income-generating activities earn higher wages compared to what they earn in legal work over time. Despite this, most offenders in our sample still show declines in offending, calling into question the role of illegal incentives in the desistance process. The current study examines changes in factors that are possibly related to an individual’s illegal reservation wage. Findings are discussed in terms of theoretical and policy implications.

Authors

• Holly Nguyen, University of Maryland

• Thomas Loughran, University of Maryland

• Daniel Nagin, Carnegie Mellon University

• Ray Paternoster, University of Maryland