The Correlation Between Deterrence and the Punishment of Crimes Committed by Federal Legislators

• In Event: Punitive Sanctions, Reputation and Crimes of the Elite

Abstract

This is a study of the effect of deterrence theory on the severity of punishment of United States federal legislators and the reasons why criminal justice stakeholders feel it is necessary to punish these legislators for crimes committed. This paper focuses on members of the United States Senate and House of Representatives accused of crimes. This mixed methods study currently has 165 cases in the research database. The importance of these case outcomes is that when the most senior legislators in the country break the law it seriously impacts the institutions they serve in, the political system and the nation’s sense of justice. All the offenders in this study were accused and most were indicted and punished, and policies need to be formulated to ensure fairness and justice, to protect the institution of congress and to reassure the body politic. Multinomial logistic regression and binomial logistic regressions were used to analyze the effect of deterrence on punishment, and a binomial logistic regression was used to study the loss of power. A content analysis was used to study the stakeholders’ comments on the need to punish offending legislators, resulting in five main categories: incapacitation, political effects, retribution, institutional integrity and status.

Author

• Kenneth James Grossberger, John Jay College of Criminal Justice