Public perception of parolees and their likelihood to deceive others

• In Event: Policies, Threat, and Communities

Abstract

Previous research has shown that the public’s attitude towards offenders can be very negative. To examine the public’s perception of offenders’ likelihood to deceive others, we conducted two experiments. In the first experiment, 120 parolees and 120 non-parolees played a repeated deception game (Geezey, 2005). Participants, who were matched but never met in person, played the game with varying payoffs. They had to decide if they wanted to play the game altruistically or if they wanted to deceive the other person and receive a higher payout for themselves. Results showed that deception rates did not differ between the two groups and that the only factor that explained deception rates in both samples was lower income. We then described the first experiment (set-up, payoffs, etc.) to an online, nationally representative sample and asked respondents to predict which factors would determine deception rates. Contrary to the results of the first experiment, respondents believed that being a parolee and greater payoffs would increase deception rates. Policy implications are discussed.

Authors

• Sarah Kuehn, Slippery Rock University

• Joachim Vosgerau, Bocconi University

• Ksenia Ochap, Slippery Rock University