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Minimum Spending in Education and the Flypaper Effect

Wed, April 17, 5:00 to 6:30pm, Hyatt Regency, Floor: Street (Level 0), Regency B

Proposal

In a decentralized education system, the understanding of how local governments use their budgets and how their budget decisions are influenced by the central government is of great importance to the design of education funding policies. In Brazil, there are two main national education funding policies that have major implications in all local budgets for basic education: (1) the conditionality of minimum use of local taxes to education, and (2) the intergovernmental transfers dedicated to education. Intergovernmental transfers and conditionalities in the use of resources are commonly employed as a way for local governments to meet the desires of the federal government, expanding certain services, equalizing local income and ensuring minimum quality for basic services, avoiding, therefore, a need for the federal government to assume the responsibilities of local governments to guarantee a minimum quality of services.
This study estimates the flypaper effect of intergovernmental transfers in the Brazilian education sector. It is well-stablished in the literature of public finance that intergovernmental transfers lead to greater public spending than an equivalent increase in local revenue – the so-called flypaper effect (Turnbull 1998; Gordon 2004; Inman 2008). The flypaper effect is characterized by a greater adherence of intergovernmental transfers than one would expect if the public manager were to maximize the preferences of the representative elector. Building over the theoretical model of the median voter, we present the flypaper effect model adapted to the Brazilian education financing policies by relaxing the hypothesis of complete information.
Our paper adds to public finance literature by specifying the differential effect of the flypaper when local revenue is conditioned to be spent in education. The Brazilian case is an informative example of both a minimum spending requirement on the local revenue and of intergovernmental transfers earmarked to education. We also analyze the responses of municipal governments to different types of intergovernmental transfers, earmarked to education. The existence of intergovernmental transfers with different characteristics – such as the FNDE transfers and the particular case of FUNDEB (FNDE stands for the “National Development Fund for Education” and FUNDEB stands for the Brazilian “Fund for the Maintenance and Development of Basic Education and Valorization of Education Professionals”) – allows for the empirical analysis of the flypaper effect with different types of intergovernmental transfers.
By using the previous year’s municipal enrollments relative to the state’s enrollment in basic education as an instrument for the amount of funds received from intergovernmental grants, represented by FUNDEB, we estimate the responses of the Brazilian municipal governments to three different types of revenues (locally collected versus state and federal transfers tied to education). We find that the elasticity of educational expenses for funds from state redistribution transfers is significantly greater than the elasticity of such government responses to funds collected locally, indicating a flypaper effect equal to 0.616. Interestingly, we do not find a flypaper effect for other intergovernmental transfers from the federal government that are done through individual agreements. We rely on the information hypothesis to explain our findings.

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