Why Elections Need Parties? Managing Free and Fair Elections in Latin America and Africa

• In Event: Democracy in Africa and Latin America

Abstract

This article aims to answer the two following questions: a) When are de jure independent electoral institutions able to aid in building democracy? And b) Under what circumstances are de jure independent EMBs able to develop and maintain de facto independence? Using a mixed methods approach, I examine the effect of EMBs’ de facto independence on the quality of democracy and the mechanisms that allow de jure autonomous EMBs to become de facto independent in third-wave countries. My investigation confirms that EMBs’ de facto independence is positively associated with the credibility of elections and that this dimension has not been fully considered in previous studies of electoral governance. Based on a medium-N qualitative discussion of cases in Latin America and Africa and fieldwork conducted in Mexico, Venezuela, Ghana, and Kenya, I argue that de jure electoral independence is insufficient to guarantee de facto electoral autonomy. Contrary to insulating electoral bureaucracies from external actors, I find evidence suggesting that adopting consultative mechanisms contribute to the capacity of these institutions to build a positive reputation over time.

Author

• Alejandro Trelles, Brandeis University