Compensating Governors for their Territorial Support: Presidential Politics and Distribution in Developing Federal Democracies

• In Event: Brokers and Clientelism

Abstract

This paper presents a study of the main factors that affect the allocation of non-earmarked federal funds in two federations, Argentina and Brazil, and a unitary nation, Colombia. Using original data from 1999-2011 on federal infrastructure investment for all sub-national units, this study shows that in developing federal countries with strong governors, presidents use non-earmarked transfers as a tool to compensate governors for sizable and secure territorial political support. Governors are not relevant in the unitary case. We also found variation in the relevance of Congress, legislative overrepresentation, and programmatic criteria across cases. We discuss possible reasons for these results and their implications for the comparative debate on distributive politics.

Authors

• Lucas I Gonzalez, CONICET/Universidad Católica Argentina-Universidad Nacional de San Martin

• Miguel I Mamone, Universidad Catolica Argentina