A Theory of Competitive Authoritarian Elections

• In Event: Competitive Authoritarianism and Clientelism in Latin America

Abstract

This paper develops a framework to study the nature and effect of electoral competition in non-democratic regimes. In this model, an authoritarian government can introduce a system of fraudulent elections anticipating a potential democratic transition in the future. If this government allows this sort of system, it will undertake some investments, a portion of which are sunk costs, in setting up the organizational capacity to mobilize new voters. This organization is complementary to the institutions of democracy, hence, once a reform has occurred, the authoritarian elite is more willing to tolerate democracy in the future. Comparative statics suggests that when non-democratic elections are more competitive, democracy is more likely. This result is investigated empirically using a panel of countries from 1972 to 2002. The evidence shows that, controlling for time invariant differences as well as global and regional trends, an increase in the competitiveness of the electoral system in a dictatorship increases the probability of a transition to democracy in the following period. We also discuss historical transitions in Brazil, Colombia and Mexico in the light of the theory.

Author

• Mario L Chacon, New York University