How We Fight: Opposition Strategies against Presidents in Hybrid Regimes

• In Event: Venezuela en crisis

Abstract

In the last decade democracies have eroded. Democratically elected presidents have tried to use their popularity to advance their agenda, destroy the system of checks and balances and extend their time in office. Some succeeded others did not. Why?
This paper argues that the opposition and the strategies they use against these presidents are essential to fully understand why some mandataries successfully thwart checks and balances and stay in power, and others do not. Using interviews to politicians, journalists and academics as well as archival research in newspapers and Congress it traces the dynamics of key institutional reforms during Uribe and Chávez’ administrations. The evidence suggests that during the first years of these governments oppositions in both countries had some institutional leverage. The Colombian opposition used that leverage, which allowed them to protect some institutional resources and eventually stop Uribe’s second reelection reform. On the contrary, the Venezuelan opposition forsook that leverage and chose other strategies instead. The latter cost them the institutional resources they had and helped Chávez advance more radical reforms.
Using that framework, the paper further analyzes the opposition’s development in later years. It suggests that, albeit limited, the opposition had gained some institutional leverage. The strategic choices early in 2014, however, hurt the institutional resources gained. The protests lost the opposition one deputy and two majors, strengthened the government and worsened internal divisions, possibly thwarting the opposition’s ability to win the legislative elections in 2015.

Author

• Laura Gamboa-Gutierrez, University of Notre Dame