Motivated Brokers

• In Event: Brokers and Clientelism

Abstract

I use data from in-depth interviews with party leaders and political brokers during the electoral off-season to show that brokers are not only motivated by electoral payoffs. Brokers also procure their clients esteem across electoral cycles to secure their positions. I argue that motivation to maximize electoral return during elections differs from the one to maximize their tenure during the electoral off-season. While the first requires strategic distribution according to electoral preferences, the second requires brokers to procure esteem and trust within their communities. I argue that both are important, however analyzing how brokers’ motivations interact and change across scenarios is insu�fficiently theorized. Brokers’ motivations across the electoral cycle is key in understanding the influence it exerts on distributive outcomes and welfare as well as potential avenues for informal accountability between voters and brokers.

Author

• Tesalia Rizzo, Massachusetts Institute of Technology