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It has become common knowledge that Latin America has among the highest levels of economic inequality in the world. Political science literature has shed light on how certain social conditions affect inequality and how differing levels of inequality influence political regimes. However, there remains a dearth of knowledge on how political and state institutions can alter inequality levels within countries. With democracy becoming the de facto norm in Latin America, it is imperative that we examine how institutions within democracies can spur changes in the levels of inequality.
Through the analysis of collected electoral volatility data, cabinet coalescence rates, and economic data, my paper shows how two countries, Brazil and Colombia, despite recently sharing similar economic growth rates have experienced diametrically opposing trends of inequality and institutional development. The alleviation of inequality primarily requires the formulation and implementation of policies that create a more equitable distribution of wealth through the institutional mechanisms of political party systems, legislative coalitions, and the state. Brazil’s recent strengthening of party system institutionalization (PSI) and presidential coalitions have allowed the country to greatly mitigate inequality, while Colombia’s weakening of PSI and presidential coalitions, in combination with a weak state, has in turn led to an increase in inequality. My paper argues that strong PSI and presidential coalitions, in combination with close party-state ties are crucial for the alleviation of inequality within countries. More generally, my paper seeks to explain how representation and institutional strength can greatly influence changes in political economy for developing nations.