Executives and Electoral Institutions

Session Submission Type: Panel

Abstract

This panel approaches Latin American executives from a variety of institutional standpoints. New perspectives on the executive show that presidents are less the monolithic concentrators of power they had been described to be, but rather leading negotiators in government. Electoral institutions and other institutional mechanisms granted by recent Latin American constitutions (decree power, urgency authority) shape the ways in which presidents mold government agendas and are in turn affected by political preferences other than their own, cabinets and congresses being the chief influences in this regard.

Sub Track

• Political Institutions and Processes

Session Organizer

• Valeria Palanza, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile

Chair

• Mariana I Llanos, GIGA Institute of Latin American Studies

Individual Presentations

• Presidential obstruction of the agenda in Chile’s Congress - Eric Magar

• Winning Coalitions in Presidential Systems: Pre-Electoral Alliances and Post-Electoral Governments in Latin America - Cecilia Martinez Gallardo, University of North Carolina/ Chapel Hill

• Decree Authority: A Safety Valve? - Valeria Palanza, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile

• Order in Chaos: Intra-­‐Party Coordination in Open List PR Systems - José Antonio Cheibub, University of Illinois/Urbana-Champaign

Discussant

• Magna M Inácio, Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais