Making Inroads? The Politics of Infrastructure under the New Left

• In Event: Socio-Economic Developments in Crucial Sectors

Abstract

In the past few decades, Latin American states have returned to more interventionist economic policies. This paper examines how the statist economic model has affected the politics of infrastructure across the region. In particular, we evaluate to what extent and why members of the Latin American New Left - Presidents de Kirchner of Argentina, Morales of Bolivia, da Silva and Rousseff of Brazil, and Chavez and Maduro of Venezuela - have reshaped the contracts that their predecessors signed with private companies in transportation infrastructure, including airports, roads, railroads, and seaports. We propose that the type of initial infrastructure privatization reforms deeply affected contract durability over time. We use a dataset of infrastructure contracts in Latin America to evaluate the effects of reform type on contract durability, with a focus on Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, and Venezuela. In doing so, this paper contributes to literature on the Latin American New Left, political learning, state capacity, and governance.

Authors

• Katherine Bersch, University of Texas/Austin

• Riitta Ilona Koivumaeki, Center for Inter-American Policy & Research, Tulane University