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Electoral democracy is firmly established in Latin America, yet some countries are experiencing what scholars alternatively call “electoral authoritarianism,” “autocratization,” or “authoritarian constitutionalism” (Schedler 2006, D’Anieri 2013, and Tushnet 2013). While election-day procedures are now widely accepted by most participants and observers, the manipulation of votes before and after polling, particularly by incumbents, remains an issue of concern. When and how do some leaders consolidate power over elections, while others do not? The specific role of the executive in controlling electoral institutions has yet to be examined systematically across countries and over time. My dissertation measures and seeks to explain variation in executive power over elections, since transition to democracy, in three Andean countries. First, I describe change in formal presidential influence over electoral institutions by tracing every constitution, law, decree, and reform in Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela. Next, I research subsequent exercise of presidential power over elections by identifying executive actions that violate democratic norms. Through case studies in two countries (presented in this paper), I identify causal factors behind actions chosen by executives. Findings have implications for understanding the role of some presidents in leading countries toward or away from democratic consolidation.