Procedural Rules and the Conference Committee: Evidence from Chile 1990-2018

• In Event: Chilean Politics

Abstract

Chile has stood out in Latin America for its consensual approach to politics and policymaking. Recent research analyzing the Chilean legislative process has suggested that this outcome may be associated to specific institutional arrangements that induce apparently consensual outcomes due to the concentration of power in executive hands. This paper analyzes the use of presidential urgency authority as it affects the chances that bills end up in conference committees. Given the procedural effects attached to the urgencies that impose the shortest deadlines (bills reported from committee must be voted up or down and cannot be amended on the floor), this paper asks what the effect of this is on the likelihood that the bill goes to conference committee to settle disagreements between chambers. We expect bills that received this closed rule to be more likely to require this third instance provided by conference committees. The paper analyzes data between 1990-2018 in Chile using a novel dataset.

Authors

• Valeria Palanza, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile

• Carmen M Le Foulon, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile