Maintaining the Clientelistic Networks: Authoritarian Successor Parties in Latin America

• In Event: Clientelism in Latin America

Abstract

This paper examines why some parties are more clientelistic than others in Latin America. To answer this question, the paper utilizes the concept of authoritarian successor parties (ASP), in other words, political parties that emerge from authoritarian regimes but continue to operate after the democratic transition. According to Loxton (2015), ASPs are successful as a result of its authoritarian inheritance: party brand, territorial organization, clientelistic networks, a model of party finance, and source of organizational cohesion. Among these factors, this paper focuses on clientelism and argues that ASPs are more likely to be clientelistic than the parties emerge under democracies. To test this hypothesis, the paper uses (1) the Democracy and Dictatorship dataset to identify ASPs whether the parties were founded under democracy or authoritarian regime; (2) the expert survey of Democratic Linkage and Accountability Project to create clientelism index at the party level. This index consists of consumer goods distribution, preferential access to social policy entitlements, employment in public or regulated sectors, preferential access to government contracts or procurement opportunities and finally influence over regulatory procedures. The findings confirm the hypothesis that ASPs are more likely to be clientelistic than other parties, which enhances our understanding of political parties in Latin America and all three waves of democratization.

Author

• Dilara Hekimci, Florida International University