Military Influence and the Rule of Law in Mexico’s New Democracy

• In Event: The Military as a Political Actor

Abstract

To what extent does enduring military autonomy in new democracies affect rule of law building, even when militaries are regarded as fully subordinated? The role of the Mexican military sheds light on the processes that link military interests to democratic practice. Throughout Mexico’s decades of authoritarian rule, civilian politicians rewarded military noninterference in elite politics by delegating comprehensive institutional autonomy. Since Mexico’s democratic transition, however, the persistence of military autonomous power has contributed to severe governance deficiencies in a key realm: public security. Most visibly, military resistance to accountability for human rights abuses allegedly committed by security force members has helped short circuit rights-enhancing reforms. Military voices have also perpetuated confusion about the distribution of responsibility for internal security: ambiguous signals about the military’s interest in an ongoing policing role have exacerbated politicians’ tendency to eschew medium- and long-term strategies in favor of reliance on the military as anti-crime firefighters.

This paper therefore suggests that military influence has served to muddle lines of security responsibility and inhibit the development of state legal accountability. Comparative relevance is ample: given enduring post-transition military power in developing countries and the spread of militarized policing, the distortions incurred on the rule of law by military influence merit deep examination. By integrating previous scholarship on military lobbying and rights accountability with a detailed case examination, the paper establishes a new theoretical framework to help illuminate how the military’s pursuit of core interests can stunt the development of a crucial component of liberal democracy.

Author

• Jacob Dizard, University of Texas at Austin