When Does Clientelism Pay Off? Legislature Size and Welfare in Brazil

• In Event: How Politics and Policy Shape Social Outcomes

Abstract

What is the effect of clientelism on voters' welfare? In this paper, we show that clientelism may produce occasional welfare improvements. Starting with a theory of clientelistic services provision, we show that the services voters prefer, and which are easier for politicians to control, should improve with more clientelism. To test our theory we take advantage of exogenous changes in city-council size in Brazil, varying the number of councilors in highly clientelistic settings. We find that an additional councilor improves infant mortality and primary school enrollment but has a null effect on education quality and preventive health care. The extra councilor has access to resources and uses job appointments to manage allocation. In sum, increasing clientelistic supply improves those public services voters’ want and which clientelistic machines can capture. This skews policy enhancement away from welfare services that are not electorally promising, suggesting that clientelistic exchanges may harm welfare.

Author

• Gabriel Cepaluni, São Paulo State University (UNESP)