Three Philosophies of Rhetoric

• In Event: Understanding Discourses of Stability and Change

Abstract

Although philosophical ideas of language and rhetoric have dramatically shifted over time, the philosophical ideal of a language distinct from the deceptions of rhetoric persists. This presentation considers three revealing moments in the history of philosophy and rhetoric.

The writings of Plato and Aristotle distinguish rhetoric and dialectic as discursive forms. Although both prefer dialectic among philosophers, both acknowledge the utility of rhetoric for speaking with those who could not follow a dialectical conversation. In Plato’s dialogues, Socrates does not condemn rhetoric when it deceives, but when it serves the apparent interests of the speaker rather than those of the common good. When the end is just, both writers recommend the use of rhetoric to the philosopher.

By the time of John Locke and Immanuel Kant in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, just ends no longer warrant any means. Locke does condemn rhetoric when it deceives and Kant insists that even with the best intentions, rhetorical discourse robs others of their autonomy and is not worthy of philosophical respect.

For the German Romantics and Friedrich Nietzsche in the nineteenth century, language can no longer be conceived only as a means to some end. Language itself deceives and therefore no philosopher could hope to avoid deception entirely. Nietzsche nevertheless continues to distinguish the philosophical use of language from deception as such. The philosopher would expose the deceptiveness of language and regularly call attention to the rhetorical elements of discourse rather than trying to conceal its art.

Author

• Christopher Swift, Texas A&M University