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Why do individual rebels surrender during ongoing insurgency? Existing research has examined recruitment into insurgencies through an economic lens, but has not fully incorporated the political factors that motivate individuals to leave. In this paper, we argue that surrenders increase when economic opportunity outside the insurgency rises, as long as amnesty laws permit rebels to turn themselves without facing imprisonment or retaliation. The permissive political environment signifies to rebels that they can safely reenter society as citizens. This combination of economic and political factors makes life outside the insurgency more attractive, inducing wavering rebels to choose surrender. We empirically test this theory using data on Indian Maoists from 2005 to 2017 at the state level, and find that offers of amnesty and higher expected income induce rebel surrender, and that arrests of rebels, civilian deaths, and rebel deaths also correlate with surrenders. These results help explain the mixed findings in research that purely uses wages to model rebel surrender.