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Neurological Indices Implicated in Moral Domain Reasoning amongst Children and Adolescents: an Experimental Study

Sat, March 23, 9:45 to 11:15am, Baltimore Convention Center, Floor: Level 3, Room 346

Integrative Statement

INTRODUCTION: Throughout development, the knowledge acquired through the environment produces distinct categories of reasoning. Moral domain theory posits that moral knowledge is organized in separate domains related to moral and socio-conventional rules. Moral rules are intended to preserve others’ well-being and socio-conventional rules are aimed at preserving social order and are being reliant on an authority statement. Moral rules are less dependent on societal standards, and usually universal in comparison to socio-conventional rules. Transgressions of moral rules mainly consist of aggressive acts against persons or their property, and are typically least accepted.
Moral domain theory does not lend itself to understanding the neurological basis behind understanding the processes behind moral decision making. However, evidence suggests that different brain regions are activated when individuals are asked to evaluate types of moral situations in which persons are harmed (Greene et al., 2001). Recent studies (Lahat et al. 2013) indicate that differences in neural processes may be involved also in the evaluation of moral and. socio-conventional rule domains, but the research in the area is little and we need further evidence collected through tests with rigorous operationalization of socio-conventionality and the reference to aggressive behavior as criteria distinguishing between moral and socio-conventional rules.

METHODS: In this experiment, 24 children (Mage =9.33 years; SD=0.56, 12 females), 32 early-adolescents (Mage =12.53 years; SD=0.62, 14 females), and 31 adolescents (Mage =15.45 years; SD=0.57) evaluated 21 moral, 20 socio-conventional, and 20 neutral dilemmas. Moral dilemmas all described aggressive behaviors. Dilemmas were dictated by an audio-recording. With each dilemma, participants had to decide whether a rule transgression was acceptable when the school principle (an authority figure) allowed this transgression to occur. Participants also completed the Kiddie-Mach questionnaire, to assess Machiavellianism, and their parents completed the Child Behavior Checklist (CBCL).

RESULTS: Repeated measure ANCOVAs were conducted to determine the relationship between dilemma reaction times across age and also the acceptability of a transgression across age (3X3 design). Gender was added as a covariate to control for its effects. Some significant (p<.05) effects emerged. Children took the longest amount of time to resolve all types of dilemmas, followed by early adolescents, and adolescents. Moral dilemmas took the longer to evaluate for all participants than socio-conventional dilemmas. Children took significantly longer to evaluate moral dilemmas than older participants. In contrast, adolescents took significantly less time to assess socio-conventional dilemmas than other participants. Socio-conventional transgressions were more accepted across participants than moral transgressions (Table 1). In regression models, aggressive behavior (CBCL scale) was associated negatively with acceptability of moral rule transgression when participants were low in Machiavellianism (Interaction term b 17.96* CI [.51 .35.41]; low Machiavellianism b -25.68* CI [-51.96 .60]), but was not associated with acceptability of socio-conventional rule transgressions.

CONCLUSION: Evaluations of moral and socio-conventional dilemmas seem to occur differently and to be differently associated to aggressive behavior, and take different response time amongst children, early adolescents, and adolescents. This suggests differences in the neural processing underlying decision-making for moral and socio-conventional rule domains. Some moderations by age also emerged.

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