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Neural Bases of Moral Reasoning: Evidence From Clinical Conditions and Links with Behavior

Sat, March 23, 9:45 to 11:15am, Baltimore Convention Center, Floor: Level 3, Room 346

Integrative Statement

INTRODUCTION: Moral reasoning (MR) is a uniquely human socio-cognitive ability based on the conventions that govern social interactions and the ability to generate social judgments and choose between right and wrong. Meta-analytic evidence supports the idea that moral processes are subsumed by an identifiable system of brain regions that are associated with the broader social brain network (Sevinc & Spreng, 2014). Thus, structural or functional disturbance to these networks could affect the way children reason and respond when faced with a socio-moral conflict. The aim of this work was to generate evidence for the neural underpinnings of MR, by studying individuals with neuropsychological conditions and using eye tracking.

METHODS: A series of studies were conducted in children, adolescents, and young adults (aged 8 to 34 years) with either Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI, N=43), Tourette’s Syndrome (N=30), or Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD, N=30) and their respective control groups. As part of a larger battery of cognitive and social measures, participants completed the Socio-Moral Reasoning Aptitude Level (So-Moral, Dooley et al., 2010; Chiasson et al., 2017), a computer-based task that presents 10 moral dilemmas represented by a visual story sequence. Participants were asked whether or not they would engage in a particular action (moral decision-making score) and then provide a justification for their decision (coded to produce a moral maturity score). Participants also completed the Child Behavior Checklist. In the ASD study, participants completed the So-Moral while eye tracking measures (Tobii) were collected, providing additional information on visual encoding correlates of moral reasoning.

RESULTS: Adolescents with both mild and moderate-severe TBI made fewer socially adapted decisions F(2,119)=5.063, p=.008, η2=.08), and had more immature MR than typically developing peers (F(2,119)=7.132, p=.001). Those with ASD understood fewer dilemmas (t(84)=4.63, p<.001) and produced fewer socially adaptive decisions (t(85)=2.55, p=.012). Despite similar levels of moral maturity, their justifications were qualitatively different than those of the neurotypical control group, relying less on social or interpersonal justifications and more on fundamental moral principles. Visual encoding (fixation count on faces) was a significant predictor of moral maturity (p<.001). Participants with Tourette’s syndrome did not display any MR deficits, but their parents reported increased internalizing (withdrawal, anxiety) and externalizing (aggression, rule breaking) behavior problems (t=6.967, p<.001).

CONCLUSIONS: Together, the findings in individuals with acquired and developmental neurological conditions indicate that MR may be affected by disruptions to the brain during development, but are not systematic and, when present, show unique patterns of impairment as a function of diagnosis. In Tourette’s syndrome, social problems were not characterized by social cognition difficulties, but internalizing and externalizing behavior problems were reported, suggesting more global manifestations of social and affective problems. The significant association of MR with visual encoding can be taken as indirect evidence of neural mechanisms underlying MR. The results complement neuroimaging data underscoring the neural substrates of MR. From a clinical perspective, there is value in considering the assessment and remediation of socio-cognitive skills such as MR in individuals with brain disorders.

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